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The specter of crisis haunts the capitalist world. Indeed, it was an all too familiar phenomenon throughout less industrialized countries in the second half of the twentieth century, and especially in Latin America during the 1980s debt crisis. Usage of the term passed the Rubicon in the post-Lehman Brothers world and has now entered everyday language among the world's advanced capitalist societies in a way not seen since the Great Depression. The various responses and uneven recoveries to the current global financial crisis have been the subject of a cascade of academic, government, media, and think-tank investigations. This volume will analyze crisis and both its spontaneous and planned responses and subsequent recovery in the context of Argentina's social, economic and political implosion of 2001-02. However, this book is unique in its understanding of the nature of crisis and how its impacts should be investigated and interrogated. First, it seeks to reject false dichotomies of "old" and "new"; instead synthesizing them in order to construct an analysis that incorporates both elements of continuity and elements of change into the debate. Moreover, the authors assert that responses to crisis do not only involve the merging of old and new, but that they are also, concurrently, responses to both old and new problems-many of which pre-date 2001.
Second, it recognizes that crisis manifests itself in a number of realms-political, economic, social-and that heuristic devices employed to investigate them must also be drawn from a number of academic disciplines. This second point is in recognition of the fact that models of political economy, by their very essence and definition, come to encompass all aspects of social life and social reproduction. In the case of Argentina's (and Latin America more widely) encounter with neoliberalism in 1980s and 1990s, this model manifested itself not just through its economic policy but also in the nature of its social contract, its cultural (re)production and its very social fabric.
In many ways, Argentina's 2001-02 crisis represents a watershed in national and regional history. The scale of the economy's collapse, coupled with a crisis of political legitimacy provoked a demand for ¡Qué se vayan todos! (They all must go!)-the popular term employed by the protestors during the dramatic events of 19 and 20 December 2001, when social uprisings across Argentina (most notably in the City of Buenos Aires) and the widelyheld desire to replace the political, legal and economic establishment as well as the neoliberal model -were articulated with profound affects. Therefore the responses and associated recovery can, and indeed must, be analyzed and interpreted through a myriad of lenses in order to adequately capture the character of the salient dynamics that are present within them. Yet at the same time, the crisis and post-crisis periods reveal a surprising number of continuities with the pre-crisis panorama. Therefore, the responses to the protestors and their demands of Que se vayan todos on the streets during December 2001 were not simply a reflection of those demands, but rather represent a complex kaleidoscope that combined elements of change with elements of continuity. In this way, the volume seeks to adopt a more nuanced approach to analyzing Argentina since 2001 than any that have gone before it.
Overview of a crisis
During the 1990s, if Argentina was edging closer towards the precipice of one of the worst crises in living memory, a superficial glance at the country at that time would perhaps have suggested otherwise. Indeed, Argentina was hailed by the IMF as the poster child of the economic adjustment policies that constituted what Williamson (1989) termed the "Washington Consensus". These included fiscal tightening, mass privatizations and the liberalization of trade and capital flows, which were promoted with such gusto by the agents of neoliberalism. By the middle of the decade, President Carlos Menem's government could boast that it had impressively brought hyperinflation (that had reached 4,900 per cent in 1989) under control and had secured strong, consistent growth. Moreover, the foundation of the entire economic model was underpinned by the pegging of the Argentine currency to the US Dollar under Convertibilidad (Convertibility) -the policy introduced by the Minister of the Economy in April 1991). As depicted so skillfully by Gabriel Condron in his cinematic parody Un Peso, Un Dólar (Condron 2006) , this policy of a strong currency and free-flowing credit engendered three sentiments which were essential to the broad acceptance of the model. Firstly it generated an air of perceived enrichment, because luxury imported technology, cars, computers and foreign holidays became so affordable. Secondly, the entrepreneurial Zeitgeist that was encouraged by the media and government convinced many Argentines that they were finally able to fulfill the dreams of their immigrant parents and grandparents by becoming middle class. Third, and perhaps equally as crucial was that it created a sense that the country's perceived historic "destiny" of arriving in the First World was finally being fulfilled (Armony and Armony 2005) .
Meanwhile the social consequences of creeping unemployment, poverty and exclusion and underlying economic problems caused by Convertibility (such as uncompetitive domestic industry, loss of overseas markets, growing balance of payments problems and personal indebtedness) remained obscured by the veil of this consumerist paradise. These problems would explode with a vengeance, but for now remained hidden in what Galiani et al. (2003) termed the illusion of "Great Expectations".
Even as late as the beginning of 2000, despite a recession, there was a general consensus amongst economists, investment banks, and international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that the Argentine economy was in a healthy state. Growth of 3-4 per cent was anticipated (IMF 2000: 5) and the banking and financial sectors were considered to be on a sound footing. Furthermore, appropriate capital and liquidity provisions were secured and no significant structural problems were identified (IMF 2000a, 6 ). In addition, overall improvements in the external environment such as rising global commodity prices, a US Dollar devaluation vis-à-vis the Euro, and a revaluation of the Brazilian Real were expected to provide a boost to Argentine exports (Chudnovsky 2007, 145) . The economy's fiscal base also seemed to be strengthening, with the primary surplus improving by about two percentage points of GDP between 1999 (IMF 2000 Mecon 2007) . Therefore, plans. These aimed to promote production and export sectors through tax incentives and commercial policy instruments (Chudnovsky 2007, 147) . However, his next move proved to be more controversial as he began to reform Convertibility in order to stimulate exports as an alternative means to obtain the necessary funds to service the debt. His method was to introduce a quasi-fixed exchange rate based on a basket of currencies, but primarily the Euro (Schuler 2002, 10) . However, the success of Cavallo's plan rested on an initial appreciation of the Euro against the Dollar, followed by a subsequent weakening, so that Argentine exports could regain some competitiveness (Interview with former government representative; name withheld, 2007).
However, in practice, the plan sent a signal to the markets that the Argentine government did not have faith in the Real Exchange Rate (RER) of its currency, prompting fears that the country would abandon Convertibility altogether. Thus pressure on the Argentine peso grew, forcing Central Bank intervention (Schuler 2002, 4 ). This in turn drained the nation's currency reserves, which fell from a peak of US$26.2bn in 1999 to US$19.4bn by 31
December 2001 (INDEC 2006, 479) .
These events took Argentina into December 2001, when the country bore witness to a series of remarkable events. In the space of one month, the country saw four presidents come and go, the largest debt default in international history (at the time), the abandonment of the ten-year-old currency exchange regime (and subsequent devaluation of the peso) which had formed the contractual basis of the entire Argentine economy since it was introduced in 1991, a general strike, major lootings, as well as the Corralito-a government decree which froze savers' deposits in order to prevent capital flight and a run on the banks. This was implemented by Cavallo on December 1, 2001 and both limited cash withdrawals to 250 Argentine pesos per week whilst completely prohibiting withdrawals from U.S. dollars-denominated accounts (although credit and debit card use remained unrestricted).
The socio-economic crisis sparked widespread food riots and lootings by unemployed sectors-predominantly in Greater Buenos Aires. In response, President de la Rúa declared a national "State of Siege" on the evening of December 19. Yet this provoked an unanticipated and spontaneous outpouring of hundreds of thousands of Argentines onto the streets, including the middle class whom were angered at his inability to gain control and enraged by his audacity to announce such a repressive move in the face of peoples' desperation (López Levy 2004, 8) .
However, rather than simply oppose this declaration as an isolated measure, the demand of the cacerolazo (pot-banging) protests that echoed around large urban centers that evening was no less radical than Qué se vayan todos! -a collective moment ( The state met these protests with violent repression, most notably on the 20 December when approximately 30 people were killed and 4,500 detained (Filippini 2002, 2) . The government was impotent to control this climate of chaos and de la Rúa, who had been in office for approximately two years, was forced to resign from the presidency, famously fleeing the Casa Rosada (the presidential palace) by helicopter. A succession of several provisional or unsuccessful presidents followed within the space of several days, as did ongoing social unrest and an abortive economic recovery plan based on a new currency. The legislative assembly finally designated the prominent Peronist, Eduardo Duhalde as President. He also oversaw the "extraordinary year" of 2002 when Argentina became a laboratory for a range of innovative autonomous experiments in participatory economics and democracy, which often involved organizing autonomously and utilized horizontal decision-making practices.
During this period, millions of citizens took part in the bourgeoning barter club movement, scores of popular and neighborhood assemblies sprang up in Buenos Aires and other urban centers, thousands of workers occupied and then "recovered" the factories and offices in which they had worked, middle-class savers continued their escrache protests (public shaming events that were first used against the perpetrators of dictatorship-era crimes) outside the banks, cacerolazos multiplied and major cities were paralyzed on a daily basis by the presence of piquetes (roadblocks by the unemployed workers' movement). This climate of mass mobilization continued until the 2003 elections in which Duhalde did not stand. By the time of the ballot, the most severe effects of the crisis had run their course. However, any incoming president would have to deal with a country brought to its knees economically, financially, politically, and socially; the road to recovery was expected to be both long and arduous.
Rationale of the volume
In light of the turmoil and rapid change experienced during and after the crisis, this timely volume seeks to understand and explain the many impacts of and contrasting responses to the However, we also assert that responses to crisis are not only about the merging of old and new models and ideas, but they are also, concurrently, responses to both old and new problems -many of which pre-date 2001. In particular, the origins of these issues can be traced back to the neoliberal decade of the 1990s and to the military dictatorship that laid its foundations in 1976-83. As such, a number of the chapters reveal more subtle and nebulous responses to the events of 2001, which often arose as a result of social and political change in the years preceding the crisis, but the intensity of which was accelerated by the upheaval of crisis itself. In this way, the diverse chapters and responses therein demonstrate that the dichotomies between old and new are rather blurred, or even "false", with crisis acting as a cause, a catalyst and also a consequence of the actors, themes and debates that are discussed throughout the book. On the theme of trying to find meaning in the demand for "QSVT", Schaumberg's chapter outlines how the collective social uprisings and spirit of solidarity that pervaded society during the crisis period symbolized a repudiation of the individualism and free market economic model which had been advanced by neoliberalism's multilateral governing
institutions. Yet in contrast to Dinerstein, rather that considering what it may have meant in the moment of revolt, she articulates how the counter-hegemonic project which emerged was unable to mature to the extent that a new social and political order could be firmly established.
Thus, it was due to this failure that elements of the potentially revolutionary movement "from below" had little choice but to either face marginalization or return to traditional reformist strategies of negotiation and compromise that social movements have historically entered into with Peronist governments in order to achieve at least some of their objectives. In this sense, "continuity" is observed through the accommodation which these movements made to the capitalist state. Yet the use, manipulation and control of public (urban) space also changed before and after the crisis. This notion is discussed by Dinardi, who explores the politics of commemoration and return to the past during the bicentenary celebrations of Argentine independence in 2010 and which were deemed a success in terms of public participation and the regaining of public space after the 2001 political and economic meltdown. Dinardi explores the narratives of state-led commemoration, which, like the literary output discussed by Aguiló, reflect a reconstitution of and return to a particular vision of the past and national identity at a crucial historical moment in the face of crisis. In this case, one of the clearest impacts of the crisis is evident in a loss of faith in governmental institutions, which in turn shapes state cultural policy.
And so, these three distinct sections illustrate how the multilayered effects of and various temporalities associated with Argentina's crisis weaved between the different social, cultural, economic and political realms. The multitude of responses to and resistances against it by a range of social actors both during and after 2001 were as much about struggles over the past as they were struggles to reclaim the future.
